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A Whole New Meaning to Having Our Head in the
Clouds: Voice Recognition Technology, the
Transmission of our Oral Communications to the
Cloud and the Ability of Canadian Law to Protect Us
From the Dangers it Presents
Sarit K. Mizrahi*
Abstract
Voice recognition technology is now included in modern devices as a matter of
course, being used in anything from our cellular telephones, to our televisions, and
even the toys of our children. While we may voluntarily interact with some of our
devices using this technology, such as conversing with Siri on our iPhones, many of
us remain unaware as to the dangerous implications of using voice recognition
technology.
Its ability to record some of our most personal conversations allows private
companies to eavesdrop on us in an unprecedented manner and amass highly
sensitive information about our lives that would have previously been impossible.
What is further pressing about this situation is that all of these recordings of our
oral communications are stored in the cloud by these entities for future use and
consultation, and are sometimes even transmitted to third parties. This risks
exposing what may be some of our most intimate moments. Imagine if a commercial
were targeted to a person’s television based on a sensitive conversation they had in
the privacy of their own home. Or, even more frightening, consider if a child
predator were to communicate with a child through their Barbie doll and use this
connection to discover their whereabouts.
The levels of security and privacy available through this use of voice recognition
technology are therefore questionable, and the ability of Canadian law to
adequately protect us in both these arenas is even more so. I seek to examine the
inherent dangers that voice recognition technology presents to its users and whether
the law properly addresses each of these risks. I will begin my analysis by exploring
the security and privacy infrastructures employed by some of the foremost
companies offering this technology, in an effort to determine if they are sufficiently
robust to protect our private information. I will then turn my analysis to an in-depth
examination of Canadian privacy laws so as to ascertain whether or not they are
extensive enough to safeguard us from the numerous threats posed by this
technology, to both our citizens in general and our children in particular.
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INTRODUCTION
In this modern age, not only are our lives becoming significantly more
interconnected,1 but everything from our cell phones, to our TVs and even our
children’s toys are increasingly being equipped with voice recognition
technology. Although we may voluntarily interact with some of our devices
using this feature, many of us remain unaware as to its dangerous implications.
Its ability to record our most personal conversations allows private companies to
eavesdrop on us in an unprecedented manner2 and ultimately use this biometric
data to identify us, anywhere and at any time, through the unique sound waves
we create.3 What is further pressing about this situation is that all of these
recordings are stored in the cloud,4 whose security is difficult to guarantee,5
which risks exposing what may be some of our most intimate moments.
In order to demonstrate the privacy and security risks involved with the use
of voice recognition enabled devices, this article will concentrate on two such
devices that epitomize these inherent dangers. The first is Samsung’s Smart TV,
which allows its users to control their televisions through voice commands while
storing recordings of these interactions in the cloud. With its initial privacy
policy implying that all spoken communications made in close proximity to the
television would be captured,6 this device illustrates how individuals may not
1

2

3

4

5

6

Last year there were 10 billion interconnected devices and it is expected to reach 34 billion
by the year 2020. See Jonathan Camhi, ‘‘BI Intelligence Projects 34 Billion Devices Will
Be Connected By 2020”, Business Insider (6 November 2015), online: <www.businessinsider.com>.
David Talbot, ‘‘The Era of Ubiquitous Listening Dawns”, MIT Technology Review (8
August 2013), online: <www.technologyreview.com>; Stacey Gray, ‘‘Always On:
Privacy Implications of Microphone-Enabled Devices”, Future of Privacy Forum (April
2016), online: <www.fpf.org>; Kayleen Manwaring, ‘‘A Legal Analysis of SocioTechnological Change Arising Out of eObjects” (5 January 2015) at 11, online:
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2690024>; Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, ‘‘A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting Social Norms” (2013)
16: 1 Yale JL & Tech 59; Ira S. Rubinstein, ‘‘Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New
Beginning?” (2012) 3 Intl Data Priv L 74.
Elizabeth M. Walker, ‘‘Biometric Boom: How the Private Sector Commodifies Human
Characteristics” (2015) 25:3 Fordham Intell. Prop Media & Ent LJ 831 at 840, 850; Anne
T. McKenna, ‘‘Pass Parallel Privacy Standards or Privacy Perishes” (2013) 65:4 Rutgers
LR 1041 at 1067; Joe Newman & Joseph Jerome, ‘‘‘Press Start to Track?’ Privacy and the
New Questions Posed by Modern Videogame Technology” (2014) 42:4 AIPLA 527.
Lon A. Berk, ‘‘After Jones, the Deluge: The Fourth Amendment’s Treatment of
Information, Big Data and the Cloud” (2014) 14:1 J. High Tech LJ 1 at 4-8; Jenna
Mäkinen, ‘‘Data Quality, Sensitive Data and Joint Controllership as Examples of Grey
Areas in the Existing Data Protection Framework for the Internet of Things” (2015) 24:3
Inf & Comm Tech L 262 at 274.
See Nancy J. King & V. T. Raja, ‘‘Protecting the Privacy and Security of Sensitive
Customer Data in the Cloud” (2012) 28 Computer L & Sec Report 308.
This clause was, however, modified after having been the subject of much criticism last
year. See Parmy Olson, ‘‘Samsung’s Smart TVs Share Living Room Conversations With
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even be at liberty to speak freely in their own homes without fearing the
proverbial ‘‘Big Brother”.
The second device that will be examined is Mattel’s Hello Barbie, which is a
WiFi enabled interactive doll that records a child’s interactions through a
microphone, processes this data in the cloud, and then uses it to have two-way
conversations with the child.7 By becoming a child’s trusted friend, this doll is a
prime illustration of technology that is geared to children and embodies the
privacy and security risks that our youth faces in this modern age.8 Consider, for
example, the frightening possibility of a child predator communicating with a
child through their Barbie and using this connection to gain their trust and
discover their whereabouts.
Due to the fact that the voice recordings captured through such devices allow
for the possibility of positively identifying their users,9 any private company that
collects and stores this data will have to abide by Canadian privacy laws. 10

7

8

9

10

Third Parties” Forbes (9 February 2015), online: <www.forbes.com>; Mäkinen, supra
note 4 at 274; Susan Landau, ‘‘What Was Samsung Thinking?”, IEEE Computer and
Reliability Societies (May-June 2015) 3.
Matt Olsen, Bruce Schneier & Jonathan Zittrain, ‘‘Don’t Panic: Making Progress on the
‘Going Dark’ Debate”, Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University (1
February 2016) at 14, online: ; Verónica Donoso et al., ‘‘Faraway, so close: why the
digital industry needs scholars and the other way around” (2016) 10:2 J of Children &
Media 200 at 200.
See Emmeline Taylor & Katina Michael, ‘‘Smart Toys that are the Stuff of Nightmares”,
IEEE Technology and Society Magazine (March 2016) 8; Meg Leta Jones & Kevin
Meurer, ‘‘Can (and Should) Hello Barbie Keep a Secret?” (1 January 2016), online:
<papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2768507>.
Although it is beyond the scope of this article, it is significant to note that the efficiency of
such an expansive definition has been questioned since its inception and the constant
evolution of technology has accentuated these doubts. See Éloı̈se Gratton, ‘‘If Personal
Information is Privacy’s Gatekeeper, Then Risk of Harm is the Key: A Proposed
Method for Determining What Counts as Personal Information” (2014) 24:1 Alb LJ Sci
& Tech 105; Stephanie Perrin et al., The Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act: An Annotated Guide (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001) at 54 (‘‘The definition
in the Act is limitless in terms of what can be information about an identifiable
individual.”).
With regards to the federal Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act, RSC 2000, c 5 [‘‘PIPEDA”], see Gordon v Canada (Minister of Health), 2008 FC
258, 2008 CarswellNat 522. With regard to Quebec’s Act Respecting the Protection of
Personal Information in the Private Sector, CQLR c P-39.1 [‘‘ARPPIPS”], see Antonio
Sergi c Ville de Mont Royal, [1977] CAI 198; E c Office de la protection du consommateur,
[1987] CAI 350; Se´gal c Centre de services sociaux de Que´bec, [1988] CAI 315. With
respect to its application to modern technology, see Office of the Privacy Commissioner
of Canada, ‘‘PIPEDA Case Summary #2001-25: A broadcaster accused of collecting
personal information via Web site” (20 November 2001), online: <www.priv.gc.ca>;
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘PIPEDA Case Summary #2005-315:
Web-centred company’s safeguards and handling of access request and privacy
complaint questioned” (9 August 2005), online: <www.priv.gc.ca>; Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘PIPEDA Case Summary #2005-319: ISP’s anti-
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Whereas most of Canada is governed by the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act (‘‘PIPEDA”),11 Quebec is one of three provinces that
enacted a substantially similar version of this law,12 entitled the Act Respecting
the Protection of Privacy in the Private Sector (‘‘ARPPIPS”),13 which takes
precedence on its territory. Seeing as how the conference at which this article was
presented took place in that province, the present privacy analysis will
concentrate on both of these Acts.
Having been established over a decade ago, however, many have criticized
the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS as being inadequate to safeguard individual
privacy. In addition to being afflicted with several loopholes that have not yet
been addressed, constant advances in technology have significantly reduced the
effectiveness of the protections provided. 14 This lack of efficiency is
tremendously worrisome in light of the severe and unprecedented privacy
violations that are enabled by devices equipped with speech recognition
technology.
In this vein, this article will begin by (1) critically assessing the privacy
policies governing both Samsung’s Smart TV and Mattel’s Hello Barbie in light
of Canadian privacy laws so as to expose whether or not user privacy is
effectively being protected. This analysis will then be followed by (2) a discussion
of whether or not this state of affairs may be rectified by legislative interventions
in light of other threats presented to users of interconnected devices.

11
12

13
14

spam measures questioned” (8 November 2005), online: <www.priv.gc.ca>; Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘PIPEDA Report of Findings #2009-010:
Assistant Commissioner recommends Bell Canada inform customers about Deep Packet
Inspection” (September 2009), online: <www.priv.gc.ca> (where IP addresses were
considered as ‘‘personal data”); Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
‘‘PIPEDA Case Summary #2009-13: Publisher collected and used e-mail addresses for
marketing without consent” (2 June 2009), online: <www.priv.gc.ca> (where e-mail
addresses were considered as ‘‘personal data”); Finding #017: Apple called upon to
provide greater clarity on its use and disclosure of unique device identifiers for targeted
advertising, 2013 CanLII 96099 (P.C.C.); Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
‘‘PIPEDA Report of Finding #2011-001: Google Inc. WiFi Data Collection” (20 May
2011) at para. 18, online: <www.priv.gc.ca> (where behavioural data was considered as
‘‘personal information”).
PIPEDA, ibid.
The other two provinces are Alberta and British Columbia. See Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘Privacy Legislation in Canada” (May 2014), online:
<www.priv.gc.ca>.
ARPPIPS, supra note 10.
See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, The Case for Reforming the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (Ottawa: Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, 2013) at 18, online: <www.priv.gc.ca>; Éloı̈se Gratton,
‘‘Updating Quebec Private Sector Privacy Law — Part 2 of 2” (11 December 2015),
online: Éloı¨se Gratton (blog) <www.eloisegratton.com>; David Dubrovsky, ‘‘Protecting Online Privacy in the Private Sector: Is there a ‘Better’ Model?” (2005) 18 RQDI 171
at 177.
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I. THE CROSSROADS BETWEEN PRIVACY POLICIES GOVERNING
VOICE RECOGNITION ENABLED DEVICES AND CANADIAN
PRIVACY LAW: IS USER PRIVACY EFFECTIVELY BEING
PROTECTED?
This part will examine the privacy policies of both Samsung’s Smart TV and
Mattel’s Hello Barbie in light of the extent to which they adhere to Canadian
privacy laws, as well as the manner in which gaps in the protection provided by
these laws may aggravate the privacy violations that users of these devices could
encounter. This analysis will concentrate on the principles of the PIPEDA and
the ARPPIPS that are most relevant to the current discussion15 and which oblige
organizations to (1) identify the purposes for and impose limitations on the
collection, use, disclosure and retention of personal data, (2) obtain meaningful
or manifest consent, (3) safeguard the personal information collected, and (4)
limit the cross-border transfer of this data.

(a) The Collection, Use, Disclosure and Retention of Personal Information:
Identifying Purposes and Imposing Limitations
Both the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS maintain that the purpose for the
collection, use and disclosure of personal information must be both identified 16
and limited to that which is relevant or necessary to fulfill the purposes in
question.17 The PIPEDA further specifies that it must be restricted to what ‘‘a
reasonable person would consider . . . appropriate in the circumstances.”18
Samsung’s Smart TV privacy policy appears to satisfy this requirement by
specifying that they ‘‘collect [the user’s] interactive voice commands only when
[the user makes] a specific search request to the Smart TV by clicking the
activation button ... and speaking into the microphone on the remote control.” 19
While this button could be involuntarily pressed by Smart TV users, such that
15

16
17

18

19

The other requirements are: accountability for and accuracy of the personal data under
its control; openness about personal information handling practices; and providing
individuals with both access to their personal data as well as the ability to challenge the
organization’s compliance to privacy laws.
ARPPIPS, supra note 10, s. 5; PIPEDA, supra note 10, Schedule 1, s. 4.2.
ARPPIPS, supra note 10, ss. 5, 12, 13; PIPEDA, supra note 10, Sch. 1, ss. 4.4, 4.5. See also
Éloı̈se Gratton, ‘‘Dealing with Canadian and Quebec Legal Requirements in the Context
of Trans-border Transfers of Personal Information and Cloud Computing Services” in
De´veloppements re´cents en droit de l’acce`s à l’information et de la protection des
renseignements personnels (Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2012) 7 at 17-20.
PIPEDA, supra note 10, s. 3. See also Chris D. L. Hunt, ‘‘The Common Law’s
Hodgepodge Protection of Privacy” (2015) 66 UNBLJ 161 at 180; Lisa M. Austin, ‘‘Is
Consent the Foundation of Fair Information Practices? Canada’s Experience Under
PIPEDA” (2005) 56:2 UTLJ 181 at 207-210 (explaining how this requirement is meant to
better ensure fair information practices).
Samsung, ‘‘Samsung Global Privacy Policy”, at ‘‘Smart TV Supplement, Voice
Recognition”, online: <www.samsung.com/ca/info/privacy.html>.
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their voice could be recorded against their will, this still provides them with as
much control as possible over which audio is captured and thus appears
appropriate under the circumstances. Moreover, particularly invasive uses of this
biometric data are prevented by the fact that this personal information is only
collected and used for the purposes of ‘‘[providing the user] with Voice
Recognition features and [evaluating] and [improving] the features,” 20 rather
than identifying them in public through the sound of their voice, for example.
Similarly to Samsung’s Smart TV, the privacy policy applicable to Hello
Barbie21 specifies that they limit their collection to audio recordings of the voices
captured when the button on Barbie’s belt buckle is held down.22 The possibility
that undesired audio may be collected thus exists with this device as well. With
the use of this data being significantly more extensive than that outlined by
Samsung, however, this prospect is slightly more concerning. Essentially, they
‘‘use, store, process, convert, transcribe, analyze or review Recordings,” 23 and
share them with their third party affiliates,24 for the purposes of ‘‘[providing,
maintaining, analyzing and improving] the functioning of the Services,
[developing, testing or improving] speech recognition technology and artificial
intelligence algorithms, or for other research and development and data analysis
purposes”25 as well as ‘‘providing quality control and . . . improving . . . the
scripting of Hello Barbie.”26 With so many uses being made of this data, it is
questionable as to whether or not a reasonable person would consider them
appropriate.
Additionally, while both the privacy policies of Samsung’s Smart TV and
Hello Barbie specify that they share their customers’ private data with their third
party affiliates, the two companies differ significantly in the extent to which they
allow their third party affiliates to use this information. For its part, Samsung’s
privacy policy specifies that they disclose the voice recordings they collect to a
single third party, identified as being Nuance Communications, Inc., for the
purposes of ‘‘[converting a user’s] interactive voice commands to text . . . to the
extent necessary to provide the Voice Recognitions features to [the user].” 27
20
21

22

23

24

25
26

Ibid.
While Mattel’s website contains a Hello Barbie privacy commitment, it is in fact
ToyTalk’s privacy policy that governs this doll, as they are the ones that manage the
Barbie’s speech recognition software.
Hello Barbie, ‘‘Privacy Commitment”, online: <hellobarbiefaq.mattel.com/privacycommitment>; ToyTalk, ‘‘Hello Barbie Privacy Policy”, at ‘‘What Information Do We
Collect? Recordings”, online: <www.toytalk.com/hellobarbie/privacy>.
ToyTalk, ibid at ‘‘What Information Do We Share With Third Parties?”, ‘‘How Do We
Use the Personal Information We Collect?”.
ToyTalk, ‘‘Hello Barbie Companion Application Terms of Use”, at ‘‘Speech Data,
Recordings and Third Party Components”, online: <www.toytalk.com/hellobarbie/
terms>.
ToyTalk, supra note 22 at ‘‘How Do We Use the Personal Information We Collect?”.
ToyTalk, supra note 24 at ‘‘Speech Data, Recordings and Third Party Components”.
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Though this does technically satisfy the requirement of limited disclosure, thus
leading individuals to believe that Nuance Communications is the only third
party company that has access to their personal information that is collected by
Samsung, this is not actually the case.
Rather, Nuance Communications’ own privacy policy maintains that the
information given to them ‘‘shall only be used by Nuance or [its associated] third
parties . . . to develop, tune, enhance, and improve Nuance services and
products.”28 As this company does not specify which third parties act under its
direction, it is impossible to consult the privacy policies of those entities. Suffice
to say, this process can go on an infinite number of times, with each third party
further disclosing voice recordings and other personal data to their own affiliates,
who may use this biometric information for more privacy invasive purposes than
the organization itself, such that there is very little actual limitation on the
disclosure and ultimate use of that data.29
To this effect, it is often recommended for private corporations to
contractually forbid their third party affiliates from re-transferring data,
though this is rarely done as it is not a legal constraint.30 That having been
said, Hello Barbie’s privacy policy is one of the few that has actually followed
this suggestion by contractually prohibiting their third party affiliates from using
the information disclosed to them for their own purposes. 31 Despite this,
however, they do share some information with their affiliates, which they allow
these entities to ‘‘use for their own research and development purposes, including
developing, testing and improving speech recognition technology and artificial
intelligence algorithms not related to the services or technology being
provided.”32 While this use goes beyond what is strictly necessary to supply
the initial service and thus runs afoul of both the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS, it
is significant to note that recordings of a child’s voice are never shared thus at
least preventing these third parties from making use of this sensitive biometric
data for their own unknown purposes.
Finally, when it comes to limiting retention, Hello Barbie is submitted to
more stringent requirements than Samsung because the former is geared towards
children, whose personal information may not be collected or stored. They thus
specify that they delete any such personal data that they become aware of and
contractually compel their affiliates to do so as well.33 Due to the fact that they
27
28

29

30
31
32
33

Samsung, supra note 19.
Nuance Communications, Inc., ‘‘Privacy Policy”, at ‘‘Collected information and usage”,
online: <www.nuance.com> [emphasis added].
See Chris Matyszczyk, ‘‘Samsung Changes Smart TV Privacy Policy in Wake of Spying
Fears”, CNet (10 February 2015), online: <www.cnet.com>.
Gratton, supra note 17 at 20.
ToyTalk, supra note 22 at ‘‘What Information Do We Share With Third Parties?”.
ToyTalk, ibid.
ToyTalk, ibid at ‘‘What Information Do We Collect? Recordings”.
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do not routinely monitor the children’s recordings,34 they place the responsibility
of the children’s safety on their parents who may access and delete all of their
child’s audio recordings should they wish. As it is unfeasible to screen all of these
recordings for personal information, this approach appears balanced by ensuring
the protection of the children’s privacy whilst avoiding the violations associated
with scanning all of this captured audio.35
Samsung’s privacy policy, on the other hand, complies with this obligation
simply by specifying that they retain their users’ information only for as long as is
necessary to fulfill the purpose for which it was collected. 36 Samsung’s adherence
to this provision is essentially rendered moot, however, because Nuance
Communications’ privacy policy does not denote anything regarding their
retention of private data, thus providing very little limitation in this regard.
Nevertheless, the problem here is not solely with Samsung, whose privacy policy
technically respects the letter of both the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS, but rather
with the laws themselves, which do not efficiently protect the use, disclosure and
retention of personal information.

(b) Meaningful or Manifest Consent
Both the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS require that private companies that
collect, use or disclose the personal information of their users must obtain their
consent in a manner that is meaningful37 or manifest, free and enlightened,38
respectively. The approach taken to consent by both of these laws is, however,
somewhat problematic. For its part, the PIPEDA maintains that consent will be
meaningful as long as it is reasonable in light of the sensitivity of the information
being collected.39 Where the data in question is likely to be considered sensitive,
as would be the case with audio captured through voice recognition devices, ‘‘[an]
organization should generally seek express consent”40 though they are not
necessarily obliged to do so.
While this wisely leaves an opening for those circumstances under which
obtaining express consent might not be feasible, it does very little to actually
34

35

36
37
38

39

40

Mattel, ‘‘Hello Barbie Messaging/Q&A” (2015) at 4-5, online: <hellobarbiefaq.mattel.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/hellobarbie-faq-v3.pdf>.
ToyTalk, supra note 22 at ‘‘What Choices Do You Have Regarding the Use of Your
Information?”.
Samsung, supra note 19 at ‘‘Data Retention”.
PIPEDA, supra note 10, Sch 1, s 4.3.2.
ARPPIPS, supra note 10, s 14; it is also significant to note that Quebec’s Act to Establish a
Legal Framework for Information Technology, CQLR, c C-1.1 [‘‘AELFIT”], states that
biometric data may only be captured with express consent (ibid, s 44 at para. 1. See also
E.M. Walker, supra note 3 at 861).
PIPEDA, supra note 10, Sch 1, s 4.3.4. For an analysis of the issues involved with the
PIPEDA’s definition of what is reasonable in light of modern day technological
advances, see Dubrovsky, supra note 14 at 177.
PIPEDA, supra note 10, Sch 1, s 4.3.6 [emphasis added].
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protect user privacy as it provides private corporations with a loophole that they
often exploit to avoid acquiring the express consent of their customers even
where it is possible.41 By requiring that consent be ‘‘manifest,” and thus explicit
rather than implied, the ARPPIPS is more respectful of user privacy by
preventing companies from bypassing this obligation, but it has proven difficult
to adapt it to the new realities of our interconnected world.42 As such, the
consent provision of the PIPEDA is significantly easier for Web-based
companies to adhere to than that of the ARPPIPS.
Although both Samsung’s and Hello Barbie’s privacy policies are sufficient
to conform to the PIPEDA in this regard, only the latter complies with the
ARPPIPS. Essentially, the data supplied by these companies about their
information handling practices43 arms people with the knowledge they need to
meaningfully consent44 for the purposes of the PIPEDA, such that it can be
implied through their mere purchase of the devices in question. 45 This remains so
even in the case of Samsung’s privacy policy, which does not inform individuals
about how their private information is being further used46 by its third party
affiliates,47 even though it might be difficult to consider this form of consent as
meaningful in the true sense of the word.48 On the other hand, only Hello
Barbie’s policy complies with the ARPPIPS in this respect. Whereas Samsung’s
policy is silent on any additional measures taken to gain express consent, the
Hello Barbie policy notes that parents are given the opportunity to manifestly
demonstrate their consent by clicking a button49 when they setup the online
account required to activate the doll.50

41

42

43
44
45
46
47

48
49

50

For example, it would not be terribly difficult for voice recognition enabled devices to be
equipped with a setup wizard that would allow for their users’ express consent through
the click of a button. See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Consent and
Privacy: A Discussion Paper Exploring Potential Enhancements to Consent Under the
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (Ottawa: Office of the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2016) at 13, online: <www.priv.gc.ca>.
Gratton, supra note 14; Éloı̈se Gratton, ‘‘Beyond Consent-Based Privacy Protection”
(11 July 2016), online: Éloı¨se Gratton (blog) <www.eloisegratton.com>.
See supra notes 16 to 36 and accompanying text.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, supra note 41 at 2-3.
Gratton, supra note 14.
Office of the Privacy Commissioner, supra note 41 at 6.
While this is not a legal requirement, the lack of transparency regarding the disclosure of
personal information to third parties has been identified as a significant issue by the
Privacy Commissioner of Canada (ibid at 12, 16).
Austin, supra note 18 at 188.
Gratton, supra note 14. See also Sarit K. Mizrahi, The Legal Implications of Internet
Marketing: Exploiting the Digital Marketplace Within the Boundaries of the Law
(Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2015) at 90-94.
ToyTalk, supra note 22. See Jones & Meurer, supra note 8 at 2.
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Despite the general adherence of these policies to the obligation to obtain
user consent, it is important to note that the PIPEDA and the ARPPIPS
maintain that meaningful or manifest consent loses its legitimacy when it is
presented as a precondition to an individual’s ability to enjoy goods or services. 51
Though this is meant to prevent companies from forcing individuals to agree to
disclose their personal information solely so as not to be deprived of this benefit,
it is difficult to reconcile this principle with the use of voice recognition enabled
devices. Essentially, interacting through speech, and thus allowing voice
recordings to be captured and stored in the cloud, is absolutely necessary in
order to be able to use the products in question.52
This is likely the reason for which Hello Barbie’s privacy policy does not
address the possibility of refusing to allow the doll to capture voice recordings.
Although not sufficient to satisfy the ARPPIPS, the simple act of purchasing the
doll armed with the knowledge of how it functions should technically be enough
to presume that people consent to this use. The same logic could not, however,
apply to Samsung’s Smart TV as the voice recognition ability is merely one
feature of the device, which is otherwise similar to any television and can be used
as such. To this extent, its privacy policy specifies that users may disable the
voice recognition feature but that doing so would prevent them from controlling
their TV through speech, except for certain predefined voice commands.53 Even
though refusing to agree to their voice recordings being captured prevents
individuals from using the product to its fullest extent, Samsung’s
implementation of predefined voice commands that may still be used, despite
this, is quite novel in the company’s attempt to respect this requirement under the
circumstances.

(c) Security Safeguards
Both the PIPEDA and its Quebec counterpart provide that the personal
information collected must be protected using security measures that are
reasonable in light of the sensitivity of the data in question.54 While the PIPEDA
specifies the measures that must be taken to this effect, it is rather Quebec’s Act
to Establish a Legal Framework for Information Technology (‘‘AELFIT”)55 that
outlines the safeguards that must be implemented for the purposes of the
ARPPIPS. For its part, the PIPEDA maintains that such security measures must
ensure that personal data is protected against loss or theft, as well as
unauthorized access, disclosure, copying, use or modification. 56 The AELFIT,
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on the other hand, states that such data must be protected by technological
means that prevent any alteration of the information whilst also protecting its
confidentiality.57 This must be achieved through the use of techniques such as
access controls, which prevent unauthorized access to this data when it is at
rest,58 as well as through means appropriate to the mode of transmission, that
protect it throughout its transfer.59 Additionally, both laws require that
contractual or other means must be used by the company to ensure that any
data it transfers to a third party is assured a comparable level of protection. 60
This obligation is significant in that it could have far reaching positive effects by
indirectly forcing these third party affiliates to impose similar responsibilities
upon their own service providers with whom they might share this data, thus
somewhat remedying the issues identified above surrounding the constant retransfer of data between affiliates.61
While Samsung’s and Hello Barbie’s privacy policies outline the security
safeguards instilled to protect personal information, the latter does so to a
greater extent than the former. Samsung’s policy merely includes a broad clause
stating that it employs reasonable physical and technical measures to safeguard
the personal information it collects.62 For its part, the privacy policy applicable
to Hello Barbie specifies that they ‘‘take reasonable measures to protect personal
information in an effort to prevent loss, misuse, and unauthorized access,
disclosure, alteration, and destruction. For example, [they] use secure, encrypted
communications when transferring all personal information over the web.” 63 By
being more detailed, not only does this clause cover all the provisions set forth by
both federal and Quebec privacy laws, but it also assures its users that stringent
security measures are implemented which truly take into account the highly
sensitive nature of the biometric data collected by this doll.
Instituting security safeguards within their own organization, however, is
only one part of the responsibility imposed on them in this respect. They are also
obliged to ensure that the third parties to whom they disclose the personal
information of their clients similarly protect it. With Hello Barbie’s affiliates not
being identified and its privacy policy not addressing this matter, it is impossible
56
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requirements by Quebec courts, see Deschesnes c Groupe Jean Coutu (PJC) inc., 2000
QCCAI 216, 2000 CarswellQue 3590, EYB 2000-178499 (CAI Qué); Syndicat des
employés de la ville de Huntington v Ville de Huntington, AZ-97151510; X v La
Me´tropolitaine, AZ-95151504.
See supra notes 27 to 30 and accompanying text.
Samsung, supra note 19 at ‘‘What do we do to keep your information secure?”.
ToyTalk, supra note 22 at ‘‘What Steps Do We Take to Protect Your Information
Online?”.
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to conclude as to their adherence to this requirement. Samsung, on the other
hand, clearly does not satisfy this condition of both the PIPEDA and the
ARPPIPS, as the privacy policy of its third party affiliate does not even mention
the implementation of any security measures, but rather only states that they will
notify their clients should a security breach occur.

(d) Limitation on the Cross-Border Transfer of Personal Information
Whereas the PIPEDA does not prohibit the transmission of personal
information outside Canada,64 the ARPPIPS forbids the transfer of this data
across Quebec borders where it might be used for a purpose other than that
which was identified.65 If such a cross-border transfer is made, an organization
will have to conclude a contract obliging the foreign third party to protect the
data in question to the extent imposed by Quebec law.66 Despite this, where the
foreign jurisdiction’s national laws would override this contract and permit
unauthorized access to this data, such as the United States’ PATRIOT Act, 67 it is
questionable as to whether such a transfer would be possible. While the fact that
the legal risk that this information will be accessed for national security purposes
is comparable between both Canada and the United States and may thus be a
sufficient basis upon which to enable personal data to be stored in the latter
country,68 this is not an established exception. Moreover, it is debatable as to
whether this position would even be adopted in regards to biometric voice data,
which is significantly more sensitive and privacy invasive than the personal
information that has been available up to this point.
Though both Samsung’s and Hello Barbie’s privacy policies note that they
may transfer the data and recordings that they collect to the United States as well
as other unspecified countries,69 they do not mention any additional measures
taken to protect this transferred personal information to the degree required by
the ARPPIPS. This does not, however, preclude them from complying with this
64
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condition, which maintains that cross-border transfers can occur as long as the
individual consents to their private information being used for purposes not
relevant to the ones identified.70 Taking advantage of this exception, both
Samsung and Hello Barbie impose this consent upon their users. Although this
imposed consent may technically satisfy the non-transfer provision of the
ARPPIPS, the fact that it strips users of their free choice in the matter violates
this Act’s prohibition against making consent a precondition to the ability to use
the services unless it is necessary for the performance of the contract in
question,71 as discussed above.72 In this light, it may be difficult to hold that
these privacy policies satisfy the ARPPIPS’ limitation on the cross-border
transfer of personal data.
Between the privacy policies of Samsung’s Smart TV and Mattel’s Hello
Barbie neglecting to adhere to certain provisions of federal and Quebec privacy
laws, and those laws themselves being afflicted with gaps in privacy protection
that are being taken advantage of by these companies, there is ultimately very
little actual protection being afforded to voice recordings captured through
speech recognition technology such that users of these devices are exposed to all
the significant risks involved with their use. While legislative intervention might
remedy these particular issues, the nature itself of such interconnected devices
still presents certain hindrances to effective privacy protection that the
enforcement of laws may not be able to remedy, as will be discussed in further
detail in the next part.

II. CLOUDY SKIES AHEAD: WILL LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION
MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN LIGHT OF OTHER THREATS TO THE
PRIVACY OF VOICE RECOGNITION DEVICE USERS?
Although the previous part of this article illustrates the inefficient privacy
protections afforded by privacy policies and privacy laws alike, these faulty
safeguards are not nearly as much of a threat to the protection of voice
recognition enabled devices as hackers. The raison d’eˆtre of these individuals is to
discover and exploit any security flaws they might find so as to gain access to the
private information of individuals and ultimately use it for their own nefarious
purposes.73 With the number of interconnected devices exponentially increasing
over time, malicious users further enjoy an abundance of attack vectors from
which to choose.74
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Both Smart TVs as well as Hello Barbie have been hacked on numerous
occasions. Malicious users have installed malware on Smart TVs, which not only
gave them access to all the personal data that was aggregated by the television
and stored in the cloud, but also allowed them to manipulate the TV’s software
and force a ransom to be paid in order to free the system.75 The ability for
hackers to overtake the television’s system has further rendered it possible for
these individuals to record and access everything an individual says in the vicinity
of the device in question.76 Thus, even though the companies providing voice
recognition services through televisions may assure their users that their devices
do not collect all their oral communications, such a serious violation of privacy
still remains a possibility.
Hello Barbie has, however, been even further afflicted with security
vulnerabilities since its release into the market. 77 One security flaw discovered
allowed hackers to break the doll’s encryption and access the voice recordings of
the children that had been stored on remote cloud servers.78 Another system
weakness rendered it possible to access the personal accounts of Hello Barbie
users by attempting to guess their passwords an unlimited number of times
without being locked out of the system.79 Yet neither of these examples is quite as
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disconcerting as when a security researcher was able to entirely take over the
Hello Barbie doll without much effort and not only garner access to all the
children’s voice recordings captured by the doll and stored in the cloud, but also
alter all of the doll’s pre-recorded responses, thus allowing unauthorized third
parties to communicate with the children and potentially expose them to
inappropriate content.80
In light of these risks, the question at this juncture is thus whether or not
more robust privacy legislation would better protect the captured voice
recordings of this country’s citizens, and perhaps prevent these types of severe
violations. Though many consider that Canadian privacy law no longer responds
to the needs of our interconnected society,81 we are not convinced that legislative
intervention would be terribly effective towards preventing hackers from taking
advantage of security vulnerabilities. That having been said, we will address some
potential changes that we believe would better protect the privacy of Canadians
from private companies by remedying the issues exposed in the previous part of
this article.82
To begin with, we propose that the obligation to limit the disclosure of the
personal information aggregated be further extended to compel organizations to
contractually prohibit their third party affiliates from making any further use of
that data for their own purposes. This would, to a certain extent, 83 prevent the
continuous re-transfer of data between partners and affiliates such that the
private information of individuals would be used strictly for the purposes of
providing them with the services to which they ascribed and nothing more. 84
Moreover, in addition to obliging companies to contractually necessitate that
their affiliates properly ensure the security of the personal data disclosed to them,
it might be wise to compel organizations to include a clause that would allow
them ‘‘a right of oversight, monitoring, and [a] right to perform an audit of the
services being provided by the partners and the premises of the partners to ensure
that they are acting in compliance with relevant Canadian data protection
laws.”85 Not only would this be beneficial to consumers, as it would serve to
80
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better ensure that the security of their personal information is being adequately
protected, but it will likely be favourable to private companies as well, because
they may ultimately be held responsible for any security breaches suffered by
their partners and it is thus in their best interests to prevent such an event
inasmuch as possible.86
Additionally, we would suggest that companies be compelled to specifically
identify any third party affiliates with whom they share the personal data they
aggregate. Although this was recommended in early case law following the
adoption of the PIPEDA,87 neither that Act nor the ARPPIPS impose it as a
requirement. With individuals being unlikely to take the additional step of
consulting the privacy policies of these third parties, however, we would further
propose that companies be obliged to include the clauses of their affiliates that
may affect the ultimate protection of the private data that is shared with these
entities. Though this may lengthen privacy policies, thus going against the
industry’s attempts to simplify these documents, it is important to ensure that
individuals are armed with this information so that they may be as well-informed
as possible regarding how their personal information is being handled. 88
Finally, in order to remedy those situations in which the law does foresee
certain privacy protections that organizations neglect to adhere to, we would
propose that the current privacy enforcement mechanism be strengthened in two
ways. Firstly, we would suggest increasing the powers afforded to the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada (‘‘PCC”), as has often been recommended. 89
Essentially, while the ARPPIPS provides Quebec’s Commission d’acce`s à
l’information with the power to impose orders on companies that do not
comply with this Act,90 the PIPEDA does not endow the PCC with any direct
enforcement powers,91 which presents an enormous obstacle to this Act’s
efficiency as well as to the mission of the PCC. Secondly, we would propose to
follow Quebec’s example by providing citizens with the ability to sue companies
in civil liability or tort for privacy violations 92 — a general right that is not
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bestowed upon all Canadians.93 In effect, the fear of such pursuit may provide
companies with an additional incentive to respect privacy laws to the highest
extent possible.
Although these suggested legislative modifications may better safeguard the
personal data of individuals from private companies, they will not be terribly
effective at protecting the privacy of individuals from hackers who will discover
and exploit security weaknesses to gain access to this information. Requiring that
more stringent security measures be instituted by companies would not prevent
this probability, as any interconnected device will inevitably suffer from security
flaws that will be taken advantage of by malicious users.94 With these individuals
using the internet to remain anonymous, it becomes virtually impossible to
discover their identities and hold them accountable for their actions. 95 Although
the regulation of hackers may be a hopeless endeavour, the ability of these
recommended legislative changes to more efficiently regulate the protection of
private information by corporations is certainly a step in the right direction.

III. CONCLUSION
As is exposed throughout this article, Canada’s privacy laws are not
sufficiently robust to adequately safeguard its citizens’ personal information
collected via voice-recognition enabled devices. Additionally, the fact that private
companies often neglect to adhere to the provisions of these laws not only further
deprives Canadians of whatever protection is afforded to their personal data, but
it also places them at the mercy of unscrupulous hackers.
While this article limits itself to demonstrating the privacy breaches suffered
by users of speech-recognition enabled devices at the hands of both private
corporations and hackers, it is important to note that these entities are not the
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only ones that might risk invading the privacy of individuals by accessing the
voice recordings captured by such devices. Law enforcement has also taken a
significant interest in these voice captions in the hopes that they might prove
useful in solving criminal investigations. In a recent case involving the Amazon
Echo — a voice controlled personal assistant meant to turn houses into ‘‘smart
homes”96 — police in Benton County, Arkansas attempted to compel Amazon to
turn over the voice recordings captured by the Echo device that was used in a
murder suspect’s home.97 Although Amazon refused to provide anything other
than account details in response to the warrant issued, such refusal has not
always stopped law enforcement from performing searches within the cloud
where these snippets of voice recordings are stored.98 In addition to these
searches enabling police to acquire cloud data attributed to criminal suspects,
they also leave innocent cloud users vulnerable to the risk of having their data
incidentally accessed as a result of the lack of segregation between the
information of public cloud users.99 As such, the privacy violations to which
users of voice-recognition enabled devices may be subjected go well beyond the
substantial ones that have already been exposed throughout this article.
Although some legislative changes may serve to better preserve the privacy of
Canadians using such devices, there is no law that will alter the privacy and
security threats that are heightened through the use of interconnected modern
technology. Their ability to capture details about the habits and biometrics of
individuals and store them in remote cloud servers, whose security is not
guaranteed, leaves users with only two real options when it comes to their
privacy: either accept the risks involved or modify their use of these devices
accordingly.
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